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I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine being the CEO and board chair director for a brand new
company that you have created. You have decided that this company will
be different than all the others out there because throughout the whole
process you want to focus on the environment. Every decision you make
will take into consideration how it will affect the environment and the
world we live in. However, you have created a traditional for-profit
corporation. You have shareholders to answer to and your number one
obligation needs to be to maximize shareholder returns, not save the
environment. What do you do?
In the United States, corporations and other types of business entities
are constituted under state law.1 Directors and officers of corporations are
subject to standards of conduct imposed by state law.2 Therefore, many
corporations think carefully before deciding what type of business to
incorporate as or where to incorporate.3 Due to state law, where a
corporation is incorporated dictates what the directors of the business can
and cannot do.4
States should allow companies to be incorporated in a way that allows
the directors of the company to consider their social and environmental
goals first before their obligations to their shareholders. By allowing a
corporation to incorporate in a way that lets shareholders know that the
company will be considering social and environmental needs before
shareholder dividend maximization, companies become socially
conscious enterprises, and shareholders are aware of the goals of the
company in which they are investing.
Many states have passed laws that enable directors to incorporate
corporations in a way that allows them to consider social and
environmental needs before the needs of their shareholders.5 On April 13,
2013, Maryland became the first state to pass a statute that created a new
corporate form to address the lack of environmental and socially conscious

1. WILLIAM H. CLARK ET AL., WHITE PAPER: THE NEED AND RATIONALE FOR THE BENEFIT
CORPORATION: WHY IT IS THE LEGAL FORM THAT BEST ADDRESSES THE NEEDS OF SOCIAL
ENTREPRENEURS, INVESTORS, AND, ULTIMATELY, THE PUBLIC 3 (2011), http://benefitcorp.net/st
orage/Benefit_Corp_vs_Traditional_Corporations.pdf (last visited Aug. 12, 2014).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Corporation FAQ, COMPANIESINCORPORATED, http://www.companiesinc.com/corpora
tion/faq.asp#bylaws (last visited Jan 13, 2015).
5. Doug Bend and Alexa King, Why Consider A Benefit Corporation, FORBES,
http://www.forbes.com/sites/theyec/2014/05/30/why-consider-a-benefit-corporation (last visited
March 20, 2015).
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corporate structure.6 This new entity is called a benefit corporation, which
is a corporation that lets social entrepreneurs codify their missions in their
corporate charters, thereby allowing social entrepreneurs to consider other
factors besides maximum return on profits for their shareholders.7 The
Maryland statute enabled entrepreneurs to commit their for-profit ventures
to a specific public good, and required them to report on their contributions
to that goal.8 Benefit corporations allow businesses to make their social
mission their number one focus.
Official benefit corporate status allows entrepreneurs to foremost
prioritize employees, communities, or the environment, not just
shareholders.9 Unlike traditional corporation structures, a benefit
corporation prevents directors from facing lawsuits if they consider
nonfinancial interests, even if the considerations damage the financial
interest of the shareholders, such as the environment.10
As other states began to enact statutes modeled after Maryland’s
benefit corporation structure, Washington took to a slightly different path
by enacting Washington’s Social Purpose Corporation (SPC) bill.11 The
SPC allows a company to pursue social and environmental goals alongside
their efforts to provide financial returns.12 Washington’s SPC bill imposes
a less stringent set of verification and reporting requirements on SPCs than
what is required from a typical benefit corporation.13 Also, while benefit
corporation entrepreneurs “must” consider their social purpose in
decision-making, Washington’s SPC entrepreneurs “may” consider their
social purpose in decision-making.14 Consequently, although directors of
benefit corporations can be sued by shareholders for failing to pursue the
corporation’s social purpose, SPCs cannot be sued because SPC directors
are allowed to consider their social purpose along with other factors, such
as the shareholders, in decision-making.15

6. John Tozzi, Maryland Passes ‘Benefit Corp.’ Law for Social Entrepreneurs, BLOOMBERG
BUSINESSWEEK (Apr. 13, 2010), http://www.businessweek.com/smallbiz/running_small_business/a
rchives/2010/04/benefit_corp_bi.html (last visited Nov. 12, 2014).
7. What are B Corps?, BCORPORATION.NET (2015), https://www.bcorporation.net/what-are-bcorps (last visited Dec. 12, 2014).
8. Id.
9. Tozzi, supra note 6.
10. Id.
11. John Reed and Ame Wellman Lewis, The Social Purpose Corporation, STARTUP LAW BLOG,
http://www.startuplawblog.com/2012/05/08/social-purpose-corporation (last visited 10/28/14).
12. Tozzi, supra note 6.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
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To add even more confusion to the mix, Vermont created a third
hybrid corporate entity, known as the Low-Profit Limited Liability
Company (L3C).16 L3Cs give socially conscious corporate directors a
third option when deciding how to incorporate their corporation.17 L3Cs
are considered a cross between a nonprofit organization and a for-profit
corporation, and are given tax benefits similar to a nonprofit organization.
This distinguishes an L3C from a benefit corporation and an SPC. 18
As corporations become more socially aware of their responsibilities
to the environment, it is important for states, constituents, and businesses
to understand the different hybrid entities.19 Only by understanding each
hybrid entity can a corporation determine which type of entity best suits
its goals and fully inform its constituents of what type of entity they are
investing in.20 Currently, there is much confusion over the differences
between the different hybrid entities.21 Therefore, it is important for states
to be cognizant of what each respective hybrid corporate structure offers
so that constituents and business can determine which structure best suits
their goals. Although many Washington residents in the business world
feel like the Washington’s SPC is a step in the right direction for green
businesses,22 there are additional measures that must be taken to force
these businesses to beneficially impact society and the environment when
making management decisions. Washington’s SPC Statute needs to be
transformed to resemble a benefit corporation statute in order to hold
businesses accountable for the decisions they make and ensure that they
enact a real difference. Changing the SPC statue in three ways can
accomplish this. First, change the statue so that SPCs must consider the
social purpose in decision-making, instead of simply allowing them to
consider the social purpose. Second, create an obligation for SPCs to
report on its overall social and environmental performance using
transparent third-party standards. Finally, provide a tax break to SPCs that
have successfully pursued their social purpose.
16. Gene Takagi, L3C – Low-profit Limited Liability Company, NONPROFIT LAW BLOG,
http://www.nonprofitlawblog.com/l3c (last visited Nov. 13, 2014).
17. Low-Profit LLC, VERMONT SECRETARY OF STATE, http://www.sec.state.vt.us
/corps/dobiz/llc/llc_l3c.htm (last visited April 4, 2011).
18. Takagi, supra note 16.
19. VERMONT SECRETARY OF STATE, supra note 17.
20. Takagi, supra note 16.
21. Renatto Garcia, Re-Engineering Georgia’s Corporate DNA: A Benefit Analysis and
Practicality Assessment for Benefit Corporation Legislation in Georgia, 6 J. MARSHALL L.J. 627, 631
(2013).
22. Joe Wallin, What’s positive about Washington’s new Social Purpose Corporations,
GEEKWIRE, http://www.geekwire.com/2012/big-positives-washingtons-social-purpose-corporations
(last visited Dec. 15, 2014).
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This article addresses the strengths and weaknesses of Washington’s
SPC statue as it asserts that Washington’s SPC statute must be remodeled
to more closely resemble Maryland’s benefit corporation statue. Part II
discusses the traditional corporate structure versus the three different
hybrid entities that have been created thus far: benefit corporations, lowprofit limited liability corporations, and flexible/social purpose
corporations. Part III will look a little closer at Washington’s SPC statute
and the arguments for and against it. Lastly, Part IV will suggest changes
that should be made to Washington’s SPC statute in order to more
adequately promote sustainable corporations. Specifically, Part IV
provides a recommendation to modify Washington’s SPC statute to model
formal benefit corporation statutes, which have been enacted in twenty
states thus far.
II. BACKGROUND
In order to fully understand the different hybrid entities that exist for
a socially conscious corporation, the role of a shareholder, board of
directors, and officers within a corporation must be fully explained.
Shareholders are known as the owners of the corporation.23 Shareholders
invest in the business and expect to be paid through the corporation’s
profits.24 Next, the Board of Directors is a body of elected or appointed
members who jointly oversee the activities of a company or organization.25
The Board of Directors are responsible for large business decisions and
oversee the officers of the corporation.26 Lastly, the officers are elected by
the directors to run the day-to-day activities within a corporation.27
Officers make the daily decisions and oversee the employees of the
corporation.28 An example of an officer is a Chief Executive Officer, also
known as the CEO, who manages the day-to-day decisions of the
corporation and manages the employees.29 Because shareholders, board of
directors and officers are different people, each person may have very
different goals and motivations concerning their vision for the corporation.
These differing views can make choosing the correct state to incorporate
23. Shareholder, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/s/sharehold
er.asp (last visited Nov. 15, 2014).
24. Id.
25. Board of Directors – B Of D, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com
/terms/b/boardofdirectors.asp (last visited Mar. 26 2015).
26. Id.
27. Corporate Officers, COMPANIES INCORPORATED, http://www.companiesinc.com/
corporation/officers.asp (last visited Oct. 16, 2014).
28. Id.
29. Id.

260

Seattle Journal of Environmental Law

[Vol. 5:1

in and creating the best hybrid entity for the corporation difficult due to
the sheer number of competing viewpoints.
Traditionally, corporations have had the choice between two types of
business entities, nonprofit or for-profit organizations.30 A nonprofit
organization uses surplus revenues to achieve its social goals, rather than
distributing excess revenue as profit or dividends to the shareholders or
owners.31 While nonprofit organizations are permitted to generate surplus
revenues, the revenues must be retained by the organization for its selfpreservation, expansion, or long-term plans, and are not distributed to
shareholders of the nonprofit.32 The point of a nonprofit organization is
not to generate revenues, but instead to succeed at reaching the
organization’s overall social goal.33 However, an organization’s
designation as a nonprofit does not mean that it does not intend to make a
profit. Rather, the term “nonprofit” means that the organization does not
have investors, and that the organization funds will not be used to benefit
its owners.”34
Conducting socially conscious activities, such as improving the
environment, within a nonprofit legal entity presents many challenges.
The nonprofit’s organization for a narrowly defined “charitable purpose”
is one of the largest challenges.35 Due to the narrow definition of
“charitable purpose,” as defined by state and local governments, potential
nonprofits are unable to work toward their environmental and social
objective because it falls outside of the definition of “charitable
purpose.”36 Because of this, broader environmental and social
considerations cannot be effectively advanced through nonprofit
organizations.37
On the other hand, state laws require the directors of for-profit
organizations, who are elected by the shareholders, to manage or direct the
management of the corporation’s business affairs.38 The directors may
(and typically do) delegate some of their authority to the corporation’s
officers, insofar as the day-to-day activities of the corporation are
30. Antony Page, New Corporate Forms and Green Business, 37 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. &
POL’Y REV. 347, 350 (2013).
31. Business Types, SBA, http://www.sba.gov/content/nonprofit-organizations (last visited Jan.
5, 2015).
32. Henry B. Hansmann, The Role of Nonprofit Enterprise, 89 YALE L. J. 835, 838 (1980).
33. J. Steven Ott, Understanding Nonprofit Organizations: Governance, Leadership, and
Management, BOULDER, COLORADO: WEST VIEW PRESS (2001).
34. Hansmann, supra note 32, at 838.
35. CLARK ET AL., supra note 1.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
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concerned.39 In discharging their statutory obligations, directors owe
certain duties—referred to as fiduciary duties—to the corporation itself
and the corporation’s shareholders.40 One of these fiduciary duties is to
maximize profits and earnings for the corporation’s shareholders.41 Every
decision made by the directors must be for the sole purpose of maximizing
profits, or they could be held liable for breaching their fiduciary duty.42 In
eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark, which is discussed further
below, Chancellor Chandler held that a public-service mission, which
“seeks not to maximize the economic value of a for-profit Delaware
corporation for the benefit of its stockholders” is an invalid corporate
purpose and inconsistent with directors’ fiduciary duties.43 In essence, the
Chancellor firmly stated that that the only purpose of a for-profit
corporation should be to maximize shareholder investment and not to
pursue any social purpose.
A. The Traditional Corporate Structure
A for-profit corporation is a business whose primary goal is making
money (a profit), as opposed to focusing on a goal, such as helping the
environment.44 Thus, for-profit corporations are legally obligated to solely
maximize shareholder profits. Most companies that the average consumer
sees on a day-to-day basis are for-profit corporations.45
The purpose of a for-profit corporation’s obligation to solely
maximize shareholder profit stems back to 1919 in one of the most famous
cases in business law, Dodge v. Ford Motor Co.46 The plaintiff, Dodge, a
shareholder of the corporation Ford Motor Co., brought an action against
Ford in an attempt to force Ford to pay a more substantial dividend because
Ford was sitting on a large amount of cash and had made questionable
decisions regarding the business’s excess profits.47 The Michigan Supreme
Court held that Ford Motor Company’s nonpayment of special dividends

39. Id.
40. Douglas Y. Park, Fiduciary Duties of the board of Directors: The Basics, DYP ADVISORS
(August 22nd, 2011), http://www.dypadvisors.com/2011/08/22/fiduciary-duties-of-board-ofdirectors-basics/.
41. CLARK ET AL., supra note 1.
42. Social Purpose Corporations: Just the FAQs, HELSELL FETTERMAN, http://www.helsell.
com/wp-content/uploads/FAQ_Social_Purpose.pdf (last visited Spring 2015).
43. eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark, 16 A.3d 1 (2010).
44. For-Profit Organization, BUSINESSDICTIONARY.COM, http://www.businessdicti
onary.com/definition/for-profit-organization.html (last visited Jan 16, 2015).
45. Id.
46. CLARK ET AL., supra note 1.
47. Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919).
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while it was sitting on so much cash was impermissible.48 Although Ford’s
motive for withholding cash from its shareholders was to put the money
into further expanding the corporation, the Court held that the
corporation’s sole purpose was to make money for its shareholders.49
Thus, the corporation could not arbitrarily withhold money that could and
should go to their shareholders, even if the reasoning for withholding the
money was to further the company’s goals.50 However, the Court did say
that it would not interfere with the Corporation’s business decisions.51
A recent example that reaffirmed the primacy of wealth
maximization for shareholders was the case of eBay v. Newmark,
regarding eBay as a minority shareholder of Craigslist.52 Although
Craigslist is a for-profit corporation, it operates its business largely as a
community service, allowing users to post classified advertisements free
of charge.53 In contrast, eBay operates its business with the goal of
maximizing revenues, profits, and market share.54 Despite these
differences, eBay made an investment in Craigslist and became a minority
shareholder.55 A dispute arose when it became apparent that eBay had
invested in Craigslist with an eye toward forming an international
partnership and making the company a subsidiary of eBay.56 Upon
learning this, Craigslist took defensive measures to make sure that control
would not get into eBay’s hands if something were to happen to
Craigslist’s founders.57 The Court ruled, however, “having chosen a forprofit corporate form, the Craigslist directors are bound by the fiduciary
duties and standards that accompany that form, including acting to
promote the value of the corporation for the benefit of its stockholders.”58
A final example reaffirming the primacy of wealth maximization for
shareholders occurred in 2000.59 The socially conscious ice cream maker
Ben & Jerry’s faced a problem when it wanted to sell the company. 60 The

48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark, 16 A.3d 1 (2010).
53. Id. at 8.
54. Id. at 9.
55. Id. at 34.
56. Id. at 15.
57. Id. at 35.
58. Id. at 34.
59. Anthony Page & Robert A. Katz, The Truth About Ben and Jerry’s, STANFORD SOCIAL
INNOVATION REVIEW (Fall 2012), http://www.ssireview.org/articles/entry/the_trut
h_about_ben_and_jerrys (last visited Apr. 2, 2015).
60. Id.
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directors of the company wanted to sell Ben & Jerry’s to a group of
investors led by founders Ben Cohen and Jerry Greenfield, but the French
food giant Unilever was offering a better share price.61 The difference in
corporate governance between the two companies was not to be
considered because the company was a for-profit company, and the only
goal of the directors was to get the best price for its shareholders.62 It did
not matter that one had a more socially responsible management style.63
The laws of corporate governance forced the board of directors to sell the
company to the better-funded French, lest they be sued for failing to put
shareholders’ financial interests first.64 This is exactly the kind of dilemma
that the benefit corporation is seeking to eliminate.
The legal issue of fiduciary responsibility has long been seen as a
barrier to companies wanting to take more proactive social and
environmental measures.65 However, for many companies, it has been seen
as a fig leaf to avoid taking substantive measures to clean up pollution or
end sourcing from sweatshops.66
In a for-profit corporation, “there is one and only one social
responsibility of businesses; to use its resources and engage in activities
designed to increase its profits, so long as it stays within the rules of the
games, which is to say, engages in open and free competition without
deception or fraud.”67 A corporate executive, also known as a board
director, is an employee of the owners of the business (shareholders).68 His
responsibility is to conduct the business in accordance with the
shareholders desires, which generally will be to make as much money as
possible.69 The argument follows that if a corporation’s only purpose is to
maximize shareholder profits, then it is unable to pursue its social or
61. Manish Bisaria et. Al, Unilever’s Acquisition of Ben & Jerry’s: Background, Motive, and
Impact, U.N.C. KENAN-FLAGLER BUSINESS SCHOOL (2005), https://extranet.kenanflagler.unc.edu/kicse/ORIG%20Shared%20Documents/Unilever%27s%20Acquisition%20of%20Be
n%20and%20Jerry%27s.pdf.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Page & Katz, supra note 59.
65. Joel Makower, California’s Bold Move to Legitimize Sustainable Business, GREENBIZ.COM
(Feb. 14, 2011), http://www.greenbiz.com/blog/2011/02/14/california%E2%80%99s-move-legalizesustainable-business.
66. Id.
67. See Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business Is to Increase Its Profits, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 13, 1970, available at http://www.colorado.edu/studentgroups/libertarians/issue
s/friedman-soc-resp-business.html.
68. Roger Donway, Do Shareholders “Own” a Corporation?, THE ATLAS SOCIETY’S BUSINESS
RIGHTS CENTER, http://www.atlassociety.org/brc/shareholders_owners_corporation (last visited Dec.
12, 2014).
69. Id.
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environmental missions if it these missions conflict with profit
maximization.70 If corporations could only operate under a for-profit
structure, the resulting business environment would be comprised of
companies that completely disregard large-scale social issues in favor of
private wealth maximization.
It is important to note, however, the level of scrutiny a court will give
to the business decisions directors make for a company. When it comes to
day-to-day decisions, directors can consider non-shareholder interests as
long as they can show a rational connection to shareholder value.71 This is
because courts review director decisions, in the day-to-day context, under
the deferential “business judgment rule.”72 The business judgment rule is
a rebuttable presumption by courts that “in making a business decision,
the directors of a corporation act on an informed basis, in good faith, and
in the honest belief that the action taken [is] in the best interest of the
company.”73 Courts reviewing decisions made in the day-to-day context
will not question rational judgments about how promoting nonshareholder interests ultimately promotes shareholder value.74 However,
even though directors enjoy the most discretion in the day-to-day context,
the decisions must show some connection to shareholder value.75 This can
cause a mission-driven company to face shareholder litigation, even under
this lenient level of scrutiny.76
The debate over where a corporation’s priority lies is not new. “A
continued and longstanding debate has been waged in corporate law
scholarship among those who favor shareholder primacy, those who favor
management discretion, and those who believe that corporations have a
social responsibility to other constituencies, such as the corporation’s
employees, and the wider public interest.”77 Shareholder primacy prevails
today as the dominant view.78 However, the view of what a corporation
should be and whom it should serve has started to change; in order to allow
directors to consider things outside of shareholder primacy, hybrid entities
were created.

70. Id.
71. See Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, at 682 (Mich. 1919); see also CLARK ET AL.,
supra note 1.
72. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984).
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. CLARK ET AL., supra note 1.
77. Page, supra note 30.
78. Id.
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B. Hybrid Entities
Hybrid entities attempt to blend aspects of for-profit organizations
with aspects of not-for-profit organizations.79 They allow corporations to
make a profit, while giving them the flexibility to consider the social and
environmental ramifications of their decisions.80 Corporations structured
as hybrid entities no longer have to look only at maximizing shareholder
profits; they may recognize social and environmental considerations,
too.81 In this article, three different hybrid entities will be discussed that
have been legally recognized in various states: (1) benefit corporations,
(2) low-profit limited liability companies, and (3) flexible/social purpose
corporations.
1. Benefit Corporations
In 2010, Maryland became the first state in the nation to allow
companies to register as benefit corporations. 82 Benefit corporations are a
new class of corporation that is required to create a material, positive
impact on society and the environment by meeting higher standards of
accountability and transparency.83Although there are different ways to
draft legislation to create a benefit corporation, there are three major
provisions that are consistent from state to state in how a benefit
corporation is created. These provisions include (1) making the benefit
corporation form a purpose that has material, positive impact on society
and the environment; (2) expanding fiduciary duties of directors in benefit
corporations, which require consideration of non-financial interests; and
(3) creating an obligation on benefit corporations to report on its overall
social and environmental performance as assessed against a
comprehensive, credible, independent, and transparent third-party
standard.84 Electing in or out of benefit corporation status is a voluntary
act requiring a two-thirds vote of shareholders.85 Likewise, in a merger or
sale situation, a supermajority shareholder vote would be required if the

79. Felicia R. Resor, Comment, Benefit Corporation Legislation, 12 WYO. L. REV. 91 (2012).
80. Evangeline Gomez, The Rise of the Charitable For-Profit Entity, FORBES (Jan. 13, 2012),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/evangelinegomez/2012/01/13/the-rise-of-the-charitable-for-profitentity/.
81. Resor, supra note 79.
82. Anne Field, First-Ever Study of Maryland Benefit Corps Released, FORBES, Jan. 25, 2013,
http://www.forbes.com/sites/annefield/2013/01/25/first-ever-study-of-maryland-benefit-corpsreleased/.
83. Resor, supra note 79.
84. CLARK ET AL., supra note 1.
85. Id.
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surviving entity would not be a benefit corporation.86 Therefore, if a
corporation decides to register as a benefit corporation, opting out of the
entity that the investors initially invested in is difficult. Benefit
corporations are required to have a purpose towards creating a “general
public benefit” and are allowed to identify one or more “specific public
benefit” purposes.87 This differs from traditional corporations, which are
allowed to form for any lawful purpose but have no explicit purpose
requirement.88 A purpose towards creating a general public benefit is
defined as a “material, positive impact on society and the environment,
taken as a whole, as assessed against a third-party standard, from the
business and operations of a benefit corporation.”89 Model legislation lists
seven non-exhaustive possibilities for a purpose that lends itself to specific
public benefits. Those seven possibilities are (1) providing low-income or
underserved individuals or communities with beneficial products or
services; (2) promoting economic opportunity for individuals or
communities beyond the creation of jobs in the ordinary course of
business; (3) preserving the environment; (4) improving human health; (5)
promoting the arts, sciences, or advancement of knowledge; (6) increasing
the flow of capital to entities with a public benefit purpose; or (7) the
accomplishment of any other particular benefit for society or the
environment.90
The benefit corporation expands fiduciary duties of directors by
requiring consideration of non-financial interests.91 Directors of benefit
corporations must consider the social purpose when making their
management decisions.92 This required consideration is a key feature of
benefit corporations, as will be discussed below, distinguishing them from
Washington’s SPCs, which merely permit consideration of the social
purpose in management decisions.93

86. Id.
87. Shelley Alcorn & Mark Alcorn, Benefit Corporations: A New Formula for Social Change,
ASSOCIATIONS NOW (June 2012), https://www.asaecenter.org/Resources/ANowDetail.cfm?I
temNumber=179687.
88. CLARK ET AL., supra note 1.
89. Id.
90. Model Benefit Corp. Legislation §102 (2013).
91. B Corporations, Benefit Corporations and Social Purpose Corporations: Launching a New
Era of Impact-Driven Companies, NETWORK FOR BUSINESS INNOVATION AND SUSTAINABILITY
(2012), http://nbis.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/ImpactDrivenCompanies_NBIS_Whitepape
r_Oct2012.pdf [hereinafter NBIS White Paper].
92. Id.
93. Id.
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Lastly, a benefit corporation is required to deliver an annual benefit
report to its shareholders and post it online so it is available to the public.94
The report must be filed with a department of the state and must include a
narrative description of the ways in which the benefit corporation has
pursued its general public benefit purpose and the ways it has pursued any
of its specific benefit purposes.95 Furthermore, they must name any
circumstances that may have hindered creation of general or specific
public benefit purposes. The corporation also needs to reveal the process
and rationale for selecting or changing the third-party standard used to
prepare the benefit report.96 The report must also include “an assessment
of the overall social and environmental performance of the benefit
corporation against a third-party standard applied consistently with any
application of that standard in prior benefit reports or accompanied by an
explanation of the reasons for any inconsistent application.”97
Directors of benefit corporations are afforded certain protections with
regard to the business decisions they make.98 A shareholder is expressly
given the right to bring a legal action on the basis that a director or officer
failed to pursue or create the stated general or specific public benefit
purposes, failed to consider the interests of the various stakeholders set
forth in the statute, or failed to meet the transparency requirements in the
statute.99 However, the Model Legislation expressly states that the
consideration of all stakeholders shall not constitute a violation of the
general standards for directors.100 Therefore, a director of a benefit
corporation has the ability to make decisions that help pursue the stated
general or specific public benefit purpose, even if that decision fails to
maximize shareholder profits. Lastly, in an effort to restrict potential
liability, the Model Legislation specifically excludes directors and officers
from corporate liability for monetary damages and forces courts to give
the exclusive remedy of awarding injunctive relief.101 This requires the
benefit corporation to simply live up to the commitments it voluntarily
undertook.
Benefit corporations are a hybrid entity that best meets the needs of
entrepreneurs, investors, consumers, and policy makers who are interested
in using the power of business to solve social and environmental problems.
94. Alcorn & Alcorn, supra note 87.
95. NBIS White Paper, supra note 91, at 18.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. CLARK ET AL., supra note 1.
99. Id.
100. §102, supra note 90.
101. CLARK ET AL., supra note 1, at 19.
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Unlike other corporate forms, benefit corporations offer clear market
differentiation from other corporate structures and broad legal protection
to directors and officers to make decisions based on the social purpose
instead of shareholder profit maximization. They also expand shareholder
rights by allowing shareholders to hold directors liable if they do not
pursue the initially agreed upon social purpose.
2. Low-profit Limited Liability Corporations (L3C)
One type of corporation that recognizes its social mission over its
profit objection is an L3C. An L3C’s organizational form is similar to a
regular for-profit Limited Liability Company (LLC).102 However, unlike
traditional for-profit corporations, an L3C expressly recognizes that its
social mission takes priority over its profit objective.103 L3Cs provide
significant flexibility in structuring governance provisions, provide legal
protection to owners and managers, and can attract private capital
investment including equity capital.104 Currently, eight U.S. states have
passed L3C legislation.105 L3Cs are variants of the traditional LLC form
and are incorporated into the preexisting LLC statutory framework.106
Thus, L3Cs are subject to the same general governance regulations
provided by the traditional LLC statute of the state.107
In general, legislation authorizing the creation of an L3C has three
requirements: (1) that the company significantly furthers charitable or
educational purposes as defined by the IRS; (2) that no significant purpose
of the company is the production of income or appreciation of property;
and (3) that no purpose of the company is to accomplish political,
legislative or lobbying activities.108 One of the main designs of an L3C is
to make it easier for socially oriented businesses to attract investments
from foundations and private investors.109
The L3C was essentially designed to facilitate “program-related
investments” (PRIs) by charitable foundations in a for-profit entity.110
Program-related investments are investments made by foundations to
102. L3Cs—A Hybrid Low-Profit Business Entity, NOLO, http://www.nolo.com/legalencyclopedia/l3cs-a-hybrid-low-profit-business-entity.html (last visited Aug. 15, 2014).
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Low-Profit Limited Liability Company, DIGITAL MEDIA LAW PROJECT,
http://www.dmlp.org/legal-guide/low-profit-limited-liability-company (last visited Oct. 12, 2014).
110. Gomez, supra note 80.
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support charitable activities that involve the potential return of capital
within an established time frame.111 PRIs are one way that foundations can
satisfy their obligation of distributing at least 5 percent of their assets every
year to charitable purposes under the Tax Reform Act of 1969.112 While
foundations usually meet this requirement through grants, investments in
L3Cs and charities that qualify as PRIs can also fulfill the requirement,
while still allowing the foundations to receive a return.113
However, there are a number of issues associated with the use of an
L3C to attract PRIs because The IRS has not approved L3Cs as an entity
that can accept PRIs.114 Therefore, there is a risk that the IRS may not
recognize L3Cs as a way to obtain PRIs and could levy significant fines
against a private foundation that has invested in an L3C to order to obtain
PRIs.115 The possible risk of not obtaining PRIs causes many private
foundations to avoid investing in L3Cs unless the IRS provides an
advanced private ruling that sanctions their investments.116
Furthermore, L3Cs can also have substantial difficulty attracting
market-rate investments because of an L3C’s statutory language, which
limits income production.117 Investors seeking market-rate returns do not
typically invest in companies that might only incidentally provide them
with such a return.118 Additionally, as a matter of transparency and
accountability, L3Cs do not have a third-party evaluator to determine
whether or not they are pursuing their charitable purpose and/or achieving
a measurable social impact.119 Unlike nonprofits, which must comply with
annual reporting requirements imposed by the IRS in exchange for their
exempt status, and benefit corporations, which are required to do thirdparty assessments, L3Cs are free to self-regulate their charitable purpose
and the extent to which they report publicly on their activities.120 Due to
self-regulation, it becomes unclear whether L3Cs effectually create a
positive social impact, or simply state that they will do so in the hope of
attracting more investors.

111. DIGITAL MEDIA LAW PROJECT, supra note 109.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. NOLO, supra note 102, at 21.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. CLARK ET AL., supra note 1.
118. Id.
119. Jeff D. Woodward, Esq., The Need and Rationale for the Benefit Corporation, TAYLOR
ENGLISH LLP (2013), http://www.taylorenglish.com/content/uploads/2013/07/GA-Bene
fit-Corporations-and-other-Models-for-Sustainability-and-Social-Enterprise-highlighted-v1.pdf.
120. Id.
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3. The Flexible/Social Purpose Corporation
In addition to the benefit corporations and L3Cs, there are two other
corporate forms that have been introduced for dual-mission businesses: (1)
the Flexible Purpose Corporation in California (FPC); and (2) the Social
Purpose Corporation in Washington (SPC). These corporate forms are
similar to each other, yet differ from benefit corporations in their stated
purpose, use of a third-party standard, and discretion to director’s business
judgment.121
The FPC legislation was primarily drafted to meet the needs of larger,
often publicly traded companies interested in possessing a safe harbor to
pursue at least one “special purpose” beyond maximization of shareholder
value.122 As a result, FPC legislation seems to protect the directors more
than meet the needs of the consumers, investors, and entrepreneurs.123
In order to become an FPC, a company’s articles of incorporation
must specify at least one “special purpose” that the corporation will
pursue, which can include, but is not limited to, charitable or public benefit
activities.124 The directors and officers of the FPC would effectively enjoy
a safe harbor in pursuit of any such “special purpose.”125 However, one
major problem with FPCs is that, while a “special purpose” can be broadly
defined, it can also be limited in duration.126 While tailoring a “special
purpose” to have a narrow definition may meet the legal objective of the
executives, directors, and investors of an FPC, it may be recognized by the
state as a “new kind of company.” This unintended halo effect in the eyes
of consumers, investors, and entrepreneurs would come about even though
the legal objective was modest and short-term socially or environmentally
responsible activity.127 One workaround for this problem is a company
adopting a narrow “special purpose” that is already in place, such as
buying enough carbon offsets to be “carbon neutral” in any given year or
building a playground. A company will sometimes do this in order to
obtain FPC status and be recognized as a company that is making a
difference; however, in actuality, the company has not changed or altered
its purpose at all.128 This process results in corporations becoming an FPC
simply for the status, whether through a general purpose or specific
purpose, without creating much change within their corporate structure as
121. Page, supra note 30, at 347.
122. Clark et al, supra note 1.
123. Id. at 5.
124. Id. at 6.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id.
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promised. This loophole is evident through an FPC’s limited transparency
and accountability.
The FPC statute provides that an FPC board of directors must provide
an annual report to shareholders and publish their report publicly on the
Internet. The annual report must contain a section providing “management
discussion and analysis concerning the FPC’s stated purpose or purposes
in its articles.”129 However, there are no specific guidelines regarding
exactly what needs to be included in the report, which enables companies
to neglect reporting the ways they may not have succeeded in achieving
their stated purpose.130
Furthermore, unlike benefit corporation legislation, FPC legislation
does not require the application of an independent third-party standard in
making the report. The absence of a third-party standard allows each
individual FPC to report on its “special purpose” activities and their
impacts as it sees fit, which can substantially limit the accountability of
these reports and the corporations.131
Lastly, the biggest difference of an FPC is that the corporation may
consider their social purpose, but it doesn’t have to consider this social
purpose.132 In contrast, benefit corporations can be sued for failing to
pursue their social purpose, violating any duty or standard of conduct, or
failing to post an annual report on the Internet.133 Because FPCs cannot be
sued for failing to pursue their social purpose, directors are given a wide
range of discretion that further perpetuates the halo effect for a corporation
that is not furthering their social purpose.134 Although the structure of an
FPC allows directors to have flexibility regarding decision-making and
cost efficiency for the corporations, the lack of an independent third-party
standard makes one wonder: what is the real objective behind forming as
an FPC? Do the corporations actually want to create a change, or simply
obtain the status as an FPC to further attract investors and customers?
III. WASHINGTON STATE’S SOCIAL PURPOSE CORPORATION ANALYSIS
On June 7, 2012, Washington followed a growing list of states by
adopting legislation that allows for-profit corporations to formally
incorporate social and environmental goals into their mission statement

129. Id.
130. Id. at 7.
131. Id. at 8.
132. NBIS White Paper, supra note 91, at 4.
133. Id.
134. Id.
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and charter documents.135 The corporate form was named a Social Purpose
Corporation (SPC). The bill allows SPCs to promote positive short-term
or long-term effects of the corporation’s activities on employees,
suppliers, customers, the public, or the environment.136 Additionally,
many qualities of the SPC statute resemble California’s FPC statute.137
Under RCW 23B.25.020, an SPC is a for-profit corporation that is
organized to promote short-term or long-term positive effects or to
minimize adverse short-term or long-term effects of the corporation’s
activities concerning (1) the corporation’s employees, suppliers, or
customers; (2) the local, state, national, or world community; or (3) the
environment.138 In addition to these requirements, a SPC may have one or
more specific social purposes.139 Under RCW 23B.25.005, a corporation
may elect to be governed as an SPC by one of the following means: (a)
one or more persons may act as incorporator or incorporators of an SPC
by delivering articles of incorporation that conform to the requirements of
this chapter to the secretary of state for filing; or (b) any corporation that
is not an SPC may elect to become an SPC by complying with RCW
23B.25.130, which requires recommendation by the board, consent by at
least two-thirds of the shareholders entitled to vote, and an amendment and
filing of the articles of incorporation.140 Furthermore, an SPC may elect to
cease to be governed as an SPC by board recommendation, consent by at
least two-thirds of the shareholders entitled to vote, and amendment and
filing of the articles of incorporation.141 Moreover, a corporation may
cease to be governed as an SPC if the directors and shareholders feel that
the corporation could gain stronger investors as a regular for-profit
corporation, since many investors are looking to invest in corporations
where wealth maximization for its shareholders is its primary focus.142

135. C. Kent Carlson et al., Washington State Passes Legislation Authorizing Social Purpose
Corporations: Bill to Permit Corporations to Seek Social, Environmental-Oriented Goals, K&L
GATES LLP (Apr. 16, 2012), http://m.klgates.com/files/Publication/ab22741e-e266-495a-a89e31fc2b781778/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/57cf9b22-d313-44d8-bfcb-9777cd5f5ef0/WA_
State_Social_Purpose_Corporations.pdf (last visited Feb. 10, 2015).
136. Id.
137. Page, supra note 30.
138. WASH. REV. CODE § 23B.25.020 (2012).
139. WASH. REV. CODE § 23B.25.030 (2012).
140. WASH. REV. CODE § 23B.25.005 (2012).
141. WASH. REV. CODE § 23B.25.140 (2012).
142. John Tozzi, Washington State Tailors ‘Social Purpose Corporation’ to Sustainable
Business, BLOOMBERGBUSINESS (March 16, 2012), http://www.bloomberg.com/bw/articles/20
12-03-16/washington-state-tailors-social-purpose-corporation-to-sustainable-business (last visited
Jan 5, 2015).

2015]

Washington’s Social Purpose Corporation

273

Additionally, SPCs are required to notify prospective investors that
the corporation’s goals will not be limited to earning a profit.143 SPCs must
issue an annual report that is available to the public that provides details
on the general or specific social purposes of the corporation’s goals,
including the corporation’s efforts to promote its social purpose.144 The
report may, but it not require to, include the annual objectives that the
corporation has set to achieve its purpose(s); the metrics used; how the
corporation has achieved or fallen short of the state objectives; and how
much money was spent in furtherance of the social purpose.145 The report
may be prepared in accordance with a third-party standard, but this is also
not required.146 Unfortunately, the reporting requirements contain
loopholes similar to those of California’s FPC.
One of SPC’s defining characteristics is its flexibility.147 Flexibility
allows directors of SPCs to create a corporation with a social purpose that,
depending on their actual goals for the company, they can or cannot
follow.148 Similar to for-profit corporations, directors of SPCs manage
while the officers run the day-to-day operations. This structural hierarchy
allows the directors to choose to include the social purpose in decisionmaking, but does not require them to incorporate the social purpose.149
Moreover, there is no tax-favored status for SPCs, which means that
corporations listed as an SPC don’t receive any tax benefits like those
given to nonprofit companies.150 Consequently, the structure and
flexibility of SPCs allows an entrepreneur to create a corporation that is
functionally the same as a benefit corporation.151 However, this same
flexibility gives directors a wide range of discretion to ignore making the
changes they may have promised.
A. Arguments for the Social Purpose Corporation
There are two main arguments in favor of social purpose
corporations. First, that the SPC is a step in the right direction, promoting
sustainable businesses. And second, that it promotes a sustainable business
143. Social Purpose Corporations, SPCWA, http://www.spcwa.com/what-are-spcs/ (last visited
Jan 15, 2015).
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Wallin, supra note 22.
149. Peter J. Smith, Washington’s Social Purpose Corporation, APEX LAW GROUP LLP 9 (Apr.
16, 2013), http://www.spcwa.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/06/Washingtons_Social_Purpose_Cor
poration.pdf (last visited Nov. 17, 2004).
150. SPCWA, supra note 142.
151. Smith, supra note 149, at 9.
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while keeping the reporting requirements simple and giving the directors
flexibility to make the best decisions for the corporation.
First, the biggest argument for the SPC is the fact that it promotes
sustainable businesses and that it is a step in the right direction.152 A
corporation’s fiduciary duty no longer lies solely with the shareholders in
generating the most profit.153 Directors are allowed to consider outside
effects of their decisions, such as environmental effects, in determining
what decisions to make, instead of worrying about whether they will be
sued for their decisions because they did not generate shareholder
profits.154 The corporation receives statutory protection from shareholder
lawsuits that generate from the directors pursuing their stated social
purpose.155 However, this argument for the SPC can also be made if benefit
corporations were created and enacted like in other states.
The second argument for enacting an SPC over a benefit corporation
is the simplicity and flexibility behind an SPC.156 The simplicity and
flexibility of the SPC statute makes the corporate form more accessible to
business owners than the benefit corporation.157 The SPC statute sets a low
floor with respect to administrative burdens and standards, provides the
necessary legal cover for social entrepreneurs, and was written to allow
founders to raise the bar for their SPC to the standards of a benefit
corporation if they so choose.158 The SPC gives corporate directors the
flexibility to run their business however they feel is best.
B. Arguments against the Social Purpose Corporation
There are two main arguments against Washington’s SPC statute:
first, that the statute and corporate entity is unnecessary; and second, that
the corporate entity is dangerous by giving the directors too much
discretion.
The first argument against the SPC is that the statute and corporate
entity is unnecessary.159 Under a traditional corporate structure, directors
152. Wallin, supra note 22.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Nic Wolfe, Is a Social Purpose Corporation Right for Your Business?, EVERYDAY LAW
(Mar. 11, 2013), http://blog.rocketlawyer.com/is-a-social-purpose-corporation-right-for-yourbusiness-912818.
156. Peter Smith, The Health of Hybrid Entities: How many benefit corporations and social
purpose corporations are out there? A comparison and data analysis on the SPC’s relative success,
APEX LAW GROUP LLP (Aug. 9, 2013), http://www.apexlg.com/?p=1054.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. See Aneel Karnani, The Case Against Corporate Social Responsibility, WALL ST. J., August
23, 2010, http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052748703338004575230112664504890.
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and officers are protected by the business judgment rule that provides
directors with wide latitude in how they go about attempting to achieve
the primary task of maximizing shareholder wealth.160 Under Washington
law, a court will not substitute its judgment absent evidence of bad faith.161
In Washington, plaintiffs may bring a general claim of breach of fiduciary
duty against directors as long as they show that the directors’ acts or
omissions involved (1) intentional misconduct; (2) a knowing violation of
law; (3) conduct violating RCW 23B.08.310 (which includes discharging
duties in good faith under RCW 23B.08.300); or (4) any transaction from
which the director will personally receive a benefit in money, property, or
services to which the director is not legally entitled.162 Therefore, if a
director wanted to pursue a social purpose because they thought it would
be ultimately beneficial to the corporation, a court will not step in and
replace the directors’ judgment with its own judgment. Thus, many people
believe that there is no need for an SPC statute or an SPC corporate entity.
However, some people believe that the purpose in creating the SPC statute
is to allow corporations a shield for their directors in order to eliminate
potential frivolous law suits before they can begin.
The second argument against the SPC is that it is potentially
dangerous. Directors of SPCs lack the clear duties to their shareholders
that for-profit directors have and, unlike for-profit corporations, do not
have any implied duty of obedience. Because the SPC organization serves
two masters—both the social purpose and wealth maximization—it
appears less amenable to standard governance and oversight.163 This can
allow directors to have great power and discretion in making business
decisions and makes it much more difficult for shareholders to hold them
accountable for those decisions. Thus, this power potentially makes these
corporations very dangerous.
IV. PROPOSALS FOR CHANGE TO THE SOCIAL PURPOSE CORPORATION
STATUTE NEEDED TO HELP GREEN BUSINESSES
Although Washington has taken a step forward by allowing
corporations to be socially conscious through the creation of the SPC
statute, the statute should be revised in order to hold corporations
accountable for the decisions they make. The statute that Washington
160. Virginia Nicholson & Christopher H. Howard, Conflict Resolution in Social Purpose
Corporations, SCHWABE, WILLIAMSON & WYATT (Dec. 10, 2012), http://www.schwabe.com/show
article.aspx?Show=12707.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id.
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currently has in place seems to make little difference and simply gives
directors even more discretion in the decisions that they make. The statute
has the ability to create a halo effect for corporations to say they are an
SPC, but lets the directors consider anything they like when making a
decision. If a director wanted to avoid considering their social purpose,
nothing would stop them. This gives shareholders and common citizens a
very skewed view of the corporation. On the one hand, they are told that
this corporation finds a specific purpose very important, but on the other
hand, if the directors never wanted to consider that specific purpose, they
would not have to. This is illogical and Washington’s statute needs to fix
this problem.
There are three elements that must be added to the SPC statute to
effectively create an improvement in corporate responsibility. These
changes include (1) creating accountability, (2) creating an obligation to
report on its overall social and environmental performance using
transparent third-party standards, and (3) creating a tax benefit for these
corporations.
A. Creating Accountability
The current statute that is in place in Washington does not provide
any guidance on how directors should prioritize when making decisions.
The statute simply says that a director may take into consideration their
social purpose. This means that a director does not have to take into
consideration their social purpose if he or she does not want to. They can
take into consideration wealth maximization like a traditional corporate
structure or their social purpose like a benefit corporation. However, if
society wanted directors to be able to consider anything they wanted, then
what would be the purpose of an SPC?
The reason hybrid entities were created was to hold corporations
accountable to environmental or some other social purposes. Therefore,
the social purpose should be the number-one motivator in a director’s
decision-making process. The new SPC law departs from traditional
corporate law in that it mandates directors to take into account a disparate
group of interests and constituencies, yet fails to prescribe a rule of
decision. Directors are only told that they need not prioritize among those
interests and constituencies. Without a prescribed rule of decision, there
can be no accountability from the directors and no way for the
shareholders to hold directors accountable.164
164. Keith Paul Bishop, How Should Benefit Corporation Directors Make Decisions?,
CALIFORNIA CORPORATE & SECURITIES LAW (Oct. 17, 2011), http://calcorporatelaw
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One of the great qualities of benefit corporations, which have been
enacted in numerous states, is that it requires benefit corporations to make
their social purpose their top priority. As a benefit corporation, directors
must consider the social purpose in decision-making. This creates clear
guidelines for directors to understand how to make decisions in order to
not be held liable, and it allows shareholders to be aware of what type of
company they are investing in. It creates accountability all around.
B. Obligation to Report On its Overall Social and Environmental Performance Using Transparent Third-Party Standards
One of the biggest differences between an SPC and a benefit
corporation is the reporting requirement. Under a benefit corporation, the
corporation must do an annual benefit report using a third-party standard,
while an SPC simply needs to do an annual benefit report with no
externally verified reporting standard. They simply need to publish and
file an annual report on how the organization is meeting its social
purpose.165
Although requiring corporations to create annual benefit reports
using a third-party standard could be burdensome and more difficult, it
would create transparency between the corporation and its shareholders.
There is huge distrust between the corporation and its consumers and
investors; therefore, a third-party report would help bridge that gap.166 If
our legislation wants to continue to allow directors to make decisions
however they wish, whether it is to maximize profits or consider their
social purpose, it would at least be helpful for shareholders to know that
they will get an honest annual report that expressly states what the
corporation has accomplished. Civil society “plays a role in constraining
corporate behavior that reduces social welfare, acting as a watchdogs and
advocates.”167 Therefore, making these corporations report annually using
a third-party standard can allow society to act as the watchdog for the
decisions that the directors make.168

.com/2011/10/how-should-benefit-corporation-directors-make-decisions.
165. NBIS White Paper, supra note 91, at 4.
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C. Creating a Tax Benefit For Social Purpose Corporations
Currently, SPCs are still subject to applicable sales and use taxes in
the same manner as standard corporations.169 In order to promote
corporations to change into an SPC and to help green businesses, it would
be helpful for the state to create some tax benefits for these corporations
in order to promote the transition into a socially conscious entity. Although
tax benefits should not be given to current SPCs under the current SPC
legislation, if Washington transitions its statute into more of a benefit
corporation statute, then those corporations should receive a tax benefit. If
current SPCs were given tax benefits, then it would not be surprising if
most companies transitioned into an SPC, not only for the halo effect, but
also for the money they would save under the tax benefit. It is important
to make sure that the corporations receiving the tax benefits are those that
are actually creating a change and promoting their social purpose.
V. CONCLUSION
Washington State has a robust economy supporting social
entrepreneurship and has proven itself a fertile ground for social
entrepreneurship growth.170 Although Washington has taken a great leap
by creating the SPC in order to allow their corporations to consider the
social benefits from the business decisions they make, it is still not enough.
As we have seen, traditional for-profit corporations technically have the
ability to consider how their decisions will impact society and how their
decisions will help reach their corporate goals as long as the directors have
a way to show that these actions were taken for the best interest of the
company. The directors are protected from lawsuits by the business
judgment rule and, therefore, do not need to convert into an SPC
corporation. It seems that the only thing the creation of an SPC corporation
does is grant even more protection to directors for the decisions that they
make. Although this is a good thing for those directors who really do want
to make a difference to their society and environment by giving them more
protection, the goal should be to create corporations required to make the
difference that they have agreed to take on. It is important that the statute
is not creating a halo effect for corporations that do not deserve the positive
attention.
By creating a statute that is more in line with benefit corporation
statutes, we are guaranteeing that these corporations will put social and
environmental needs before profits. We are creating a corporation that the
169. Wolfe, supra note 155.
170. Smith, supra note 149.
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people can hold accountable for the goals they have set out and not
allowing any corporation to simply take the title of a benefit corporation.
A corporation must truly plan on making the difference that it claims.
Accountability is huge and it is important to guarantee that these
corporations are reaching for the goals they have claimed to set out.
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